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ARTICLES 
PRIVATE EQUITY’S THREE LESSONS FOR 
AGENCY THEORY 
William W. Bratton*
Agency theory posits that separation of ownership and control opens up 
a governance deficit.
 
1 The shareholder principals, it says, have a collective 
action problem that leaves them without an economic incentive to monitor 
their manager agents.2 The theory, in its original form, held out the hostile 
takeover as a cure.3 Unfortunately for the theory, the hostile takeover went 
on to evolve as a transaction mode too costly to serve as a universal 
governance corrective.4
Still looking to make up the deficit, agency theorists turned to holders 
of large blocks of stock.
 
5 But this inquiry led to an intractable tradeoff. 
Separation of ownership and control holds out the benefit of liquidity and 
easy exit through the trading market even as it leaves the manager-
shareholder incentive problem unsolved.6 Meanwhile, the blockholder 
alternative reduces liquidity even as it ameliorates the manager-shareholder 
incentive problem.7 As a result, blockholding poses its own incentive 
problem. A rational blockholder is unlikely to give up the benefits of 
liquidity in order to extract gains from improved governance if required to 
share those gains with the rest of a free-riding shareholder population.8 A 
different sort of governance dysfunction follows—a rational blockholder 
will seek compensation for its governance contribution through self-dealing 
transactions, insider trading, or some other unshared mode of return.9
The blockholder inquiry having led to an impasse, agency theorists look 
for other means to circumvent the tradeoffs. This search returns again and 
again to the sleeping giant of corporate governance, the institutional 
investor community.
 
10
                                                                                                                 
 *  Peter P. Weidenbruch, Jr., Professor of Business Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
 1. Jean Tirole, Corporate Governance, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1, 1 (2001). 
 2. See generally id. 
 3. See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, 
Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 233–36 (2008). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Frank Heflin & Kenneth W. Shaw, Blockholder Ownership and Market Liquidity, 35 J. 
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 621 (2000). 
 6. See generally id. at 622. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Corporate Governance Crises and 
Related Party Transactions: A Post-Parmalat Agenda, AMSTERDAM CENTER FOR CORPORATE 
FINANCE, available at http://www.accf.nl/uploads/corp%20gov%20crises%20and%20related 
%20party%20transactions.pdf. 
 9. See Heflin & Shaw, supra note 5, at 622. 
 10. Tirole, supra note 1, at 2. 
 The giant, although fitfully wakeful, has not risen 
from its bed. 
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Private equity buyouts occupy an anomalous but intriguing place in this 
unsettled governance picture. Buyouts carry blockholding out to its logical 
conclusion, completely removing the target firm from the equity trading 
market and, in so doing, making the ultimate liquidity sacrifice.11 A given 
buyout is conducted by a limited partnership (the “buyout fund”) that is 
organized and promoted by a private equity firm (the “buyout firm”).12 The 
buyout firm serves as the buyout fund’s general partner, selecting the going 
private target, effecting the buyout, and undertaking the role of target firm 
monitor.13 The buyout fund, which draws its risk capital from institutional 
investors who take the fund’s limited partnership shares, is the purchasing 
entity.14 The fund takes the majority equity stake in the target, with the 
target’s managers as the only minority shareholders.15 The buyout fund’s 
limited partnership agreement, along with the transaction’s other operative 
contracts, allocates the risks and returns between the buyout firm and the 
outside institutional investors.16
The buyout target emerges from the control transfer with a governance 
structure that approaches the agency ideal.
 
17 Its incumbent managers get 
high-powered incentives as minority shareholders.18 Even better, the 
arrangements effected by the buyout fund’s limited partnership agreement 
solve the blockholder incentive problem. The buyout firm, as general 
partner, has a high-powered incentive to monitor, and all matters respecting 
allocation of risk and returns between the monitor and the outside equity 
investors are determined ex ante, eliminating free rider and aggregation 
problems.19
Buyouts accordingly have a mesmerizing effect on some agency 
theorists, who propose ownership by buyout funds as a strong form solution 
to the problem of separated ownership and control.
 
20  But liquidity remains 
a problem that diminishes the buyout’s plausibility as a universal 
governance solution. Investors readily sink capital into publicly traded 
equities on an indefinite durational basis, but only if given assurance of 
trading liquidity.21
                                                                                                                 
 11. Harry DeAngelo et al., Going Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth, 27 
J.L. & ECON. 367, 374 (1984). 
 12. Id. at 367. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 370. 
 15. Id. at 367. 
 16. Id. 
 17. DeAngelo et al., supra note 11, at 367. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept.–Oct. 
1989), revised 1997, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=146149 [hereinafter Eclipse of the 
Public Corporation]; see also Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 3, at 233–236. 
 21. See Garry D. Bruton et al., Corporate Restructuring and Performance: An Agency 
Perspective on the Complete Buyout Cycle, 55 J. BUS. RES. 709, 710 (2002). 
 Private equity contracts finesse the problem by limiting 
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the buyout fund’s duration, putting the buyout firm on a tight, ten-year 
leash, with liquidation and cash distribution at the end of the term.22 Public 
markets loom large once the liquidation phase is reached. The most 
profitable subsets of buyout targets are liquidated through initial public 
offerings prior to the ten-year terms’ expiration.23  Many other targets are 
purchased by publicly traded companies. Buyouts accordingly do not trump 
trading markets; they coexist with them in a symbiotic relationship.24
Part I addresses agency theory’s three-way association among control 
transfers, governance discipline, and hostile takeovers, suggesting that this 
triptych needs to be unbundled and reconsidered. Given the recent move to 
buyouts, we no longer need assume that hostility is the acquisition mode 
best-suited to post merger disciplinary governance. Today’s disciplinary 
mergers are friendly. Part II considers agency theory’s account of buyout 
motivations. The theory posits a transactional margin at which agency cost 
reduction determines control outcomes.
 Even 
as buyouts pose a structural alternative to separated ownership and control, 
their business model exploits and depends on market liquidity. 
Thus does the prevailing view about buyouts draw on the framework of 
agency theory and looks for lessons respecting the theory’s unsolved 
problem, the separation of ownership and control. This Article, in contrast, 
changes the inquiry’s direction. Where agency theory focuses on the 
buyout’s implications for separated ownership and control, this Article 
considers the buyout’s implications for agency theory. It points out, in its 
three parts, what the buyout tells us about agency. 
25 On first inspection, private equity 
buyouts neatly fit this picture. But a deeper examination shows that buyouts 
are driven by the economics of leverage, with agency cost reduction taking 
only a secondary motivational role. Part III looks at financial returns, 
showing that even as buyouts ameliorate the agency costs of separated 
ownership and control, buyout structures implicate their own agency costs 
in the form of fees paid to buyout firms. Studies show that buyout firms 
take so much of the transactional gain that the institutions investing in 
buyout funds would be better off investing in market indices.26
                                                                                                                 
 22. Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, Venture-Capital Exits in Canada and the 
United States, 53 UNIV. OF TORONTO L. J. 101, 160 (2008). 
 23. See Bruton et al., supra note 21, at 710. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Tirole, supra note 1, at 2. 
 26. See discussion infra Part III. 
 There 
results question the line of agency theory that looks to institutional investors 
as agency cost reducing monitors. There also result questions respecting 
buyouts’ incentive compatibility, questions raising doubts as to whether 
buyout governance structures hold out a template for improving corporate 
governance generally, even as a matter of agency theory. 
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I. BOOM AND BUST: IMPLICATIONS FOR AGENCY THEORY 
Private equity buyouts and hostile takeovers pursue different 
transactional routes to the common goal of governance discipline, the 
former cooperative and friendly and the latter uncooperative and unfriendly. 
This Part compares their records of occurrence across the past three decades 
to show the buyout’s emergence as the more salient mode of disciplinary 
control transfer. The comparison suggests that agency theory needs to relax 
its categorical association between hostile transactions and disciplinary 
results. 
A. BUYOUT CYCLES 
Private equity buyouts occur in cycles.27 Between 1979 and 2007, two 
cycles of buyouts occurred: the first peaked in the 1980s, and the second 
began in the late 1990s, peaked in 2006 (or, more precisely, in the first half 
of 2007) and then began to decline.28 Between the two booms was a 
spectacular bust from 1990 to 1997.29 Another bust appears to be in its early 
stage—preliminary figures for 2008 show the dollar volume of buyouts at 
less than one-third of the 2007 volume.30
Total Public Acquisitions, 1979–2007
 
 
Figure I: Buyouts as a Percentage of  
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 27. See Figure I.  
 28. See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in 
the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 123 (2001). 
 29. Id. at 122–123. 
 30. See Amerbereen Choudhury, Cerebus, Carlyle Profit From Sales in LBO Drought, Aug. 
13, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&refer=home&sid=aJGREa0y 
4Qvg. 
 31. Figure I presents Mergerstat’s annual data on the number of “going private” transactions as 
a percentage of total public company acquisitions. Mergerstat defines “going private” as an 
acquisition of a publicly-traded company by a private investment group or individual where the 
buyer is not an operating business. The data thus picks up classic 1980s leveraged buyouts and 
their evolutionary successors, contemporary private equity transactions.  
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Figure I, which is based on a number of transactions, somewhat 
overstates the salience of buyouts in the wider merger market. A 
comparison based on transaction value rather than numbers of transactions 
would show a smaller percentage of total acquisitions for going private 
transactions, because buyouts tend to involve smaller firms.32 The dollar 
amounts remain impressive, however. During the recent buyout boom, 
buyouts went from an aggregate $154 billion in 1999 to $907 billion in 
2006, with a 29 percent cumulative annual growth rate.33 Private equity’s 
value-based share of merger activity increased in tandem, showing a 
cumulative annual growth rate of 27 percent from 1999 to 2006.34 Dollar 
amounts of individual buyout deals rose as the cycle peaked: between 2005 
and 2007, the average buyout tripled in size to weigh in at $1.3 billion.35
B. THE FIRST BOOM AND THE AGENCY ACCOUNT 
 
A widely-accepted agency story accompanied the buyout’s first rise 
during the 1980s. The story followed from Michael Jensen’s account of 
suboptimal management performance and correction through capital market 
intervention.36 For Jensen, the outbreak of manager-shareholder conflict 
stemmed from the managers’ habit of reinvesting “free cash flow,” defined 
as cash flows from operations in excess of those necessary to fund positive 
return investments.37 The money, said Jensen, was being put into 
unproductive plant and value-reducing acquisitions when it should have 
been paid out to the shareholders.38 Hostile takeovers and friendly 
leveraged buyouts were said to address the problem.39 Both paid 
shareholders a premium over market, in effect making up for past 
deprivations of cash flow.40 They also led to divestment of subpar 
acquisitions and to redirection of investment policy in productive 
directions.41 Leverage also played a part in this disciplinary redirection of 
corporate focus.42 A higher level of corporate borrowing raised the rate of 
return on equity, even as it lowered the corporation’s overall cost of capital 
due to tax savings.43
                                                                                                                 
 32. A comparison of Mergerstat’s annual record of total public company acquisitions and its 
annual record of going private transactions establishes this, showing that private equity dollar 
volume approximated its share of total acquisitions only at the peak of the recent cycle. 
 33. See Blackstone Group L.P., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 115 (Mar. 22, 2007). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs, Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (Papers & Proceedings 1986). 
 37. Id. at 324. 
 38. Id. at 328. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Jensen, supra note 36, at 328. 
 43. Id. 
 More debt also encouraged management discipline on 
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a going-concern basis.44 Given the mandatory nature of the debt payments, 
they deterred ongoing waste of cash, thus returning the capital to the 
markets.45
Jensen took the governance and capital structure of buyouts as an 
agency solution to separated ownership and control, suggesting that the 
“LBO Association,” with its combination of high leverage, control in the 
hands of market intermediaries, and high powered incentives for managers, 
amounted to a robust one-size-fits-all mode of governance.
 
46
The buyout retained its prestige in agency theory even as new deals 
disappeared. This reputational persistence stemmed partly from the 
attribution of the early 1990s shift away from leverage to regulatory 
constraints.
 But the 
buyout’s disappearance in the early 1990s put an end to the claim of an 
early, levered disappearance of separated ownership and control. At no time 
since then has high leverage been seen as suited to a permanent place in 
corporate capital structures or as the sine qua non of shareholder value 
maximization. The rewards only intermittently outweigh the risks. 
47 The continued vitality of the shareholder value norm and its 
dispersion into management suites also played a role. The 1980s came to be 
seen as a period of shock therapy that redirected management priorities in a 
more productive direction, revitalizing managers normally slow to adapt to 
changed conditions.48 Newly enabled capital markets imposed responsive 
strategies as management learned its lesson. In the 1990s, managers, 
incentivized by stock option compensation, voluntarily downsized their 
operations and unbundled conglomerates.49 According to agency theorists, 
the shareholder value approach became dominant because the capital 
markets had a comparative advantage in initiating structural reforms 
necessitated by deregulation and technological change.50
The buyout’s good reputation also found support in empirical studies. 
These looked at the 1980s’ deals from various points of view and confirmed 
the story of governance improvement.
 Buyouts were a 
means to that end. 
51
                                                                                                                 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 323–24. 
 46. See generally Eclipse of the Public Corporation, supra note 20 (modeling the LBO 
association and asserting its superiority as a governance structure). 
 47. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1831e(d) (2000) (providing that thrift 
institutions may only invest in investment grade debt securities); 1991 Conn. Acts 91-262 §§ 3(c), 
4(c) (limiting junk bonds to 10% of insurance company portfolios). This point had some validity 
as far as concerning risky lending by regulated institutions such as savings banks and insurance 
companies. 
 48. See Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 28, at 122. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 The increased leverage and 
incentive realignment was shown positively to affect operating performance 
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and productivity.52 There was also evidence of increased sales and cash 
flows, decreased expenditures, improved margins and reduced capital 
requirements.53
C. THE SECOND BOOM AND THE DISCIPLINARY MERGER 
 
When buyouts reappeared in significant volume around the turn of the 
twenty-first century, questions about their place in agency theory returned. 
Some again asserted that the reappearance heralded the eclipse of separated 
ownership and control.54 Others looked for explanations grounded in 
changes in the risk management environment.55 Still others, looking at 
buyouts’ historical track record, saw a cyclical phenomenon driven by 
secular conditions that lacked overarching theoretical significance.56
Agency theory makes the hostile takeover the lynchpin of an efficient, 
market-driven governance framework.
 
Consider now a fourth suggestion: Private equity buyouts are the real world 
instantiation of the disciplinary merger predicted by agency theory. As 
such, they highlight some infirmities in the theory. 
57 This follows in part from an 
economic theory of mergers, which assumes the strong version of the 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH): a firm’s stock price accurately reflects 
its intrinsic value.58 Given this assumption, a bidding firm will pay a 
premium over the market price of a target’s stock only if the proposed 
combination creates new value sufficient to cover the price paid and to 
assure a profit.59 A merger or takeover can create the necessary value in two 
cases. The first is the synergistic merger: a transaction where valuable 
synergies arise from combining the operations of the bidder and target 
firms, such as cost savings or technological advances.60
                                                                                                                 
 52. Bruton et al., supra note 21, at 710. 
 53. See Erkki Nikoskelainen & Mike Wright, The Impact of Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms on Value Increase in Leveraged Buyouts, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 511, 512 (2007) 
(surveying the empirical studies); see also Bruton et al., supra note 21, at 711 (same). 
 54. See Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 3, at 251–62. 
 55. See Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? 25–26, 
28–34 (Aug. 10, 2008) (unpublished Working Paper, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1215188) (suggesting that the proliferation of derivative devices opens up 
new means of spreading risk and so makes public ownership less important, and that private 
ownership at the same time facilitates better risk management of complex derivative positions). 
 The second case is 
the disciplinary merger: a transaction motivated by the target management’s 
 56. See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity (Eur. Corp. 
Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 082, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=982114. 
 57. Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 3, at 233–36. 
 58. See Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics (Princeton U. 
CEPS, Working Paper No. 91, 2001). 
 59. See NICHOLAS DIMSDALE & MARTHA PREVEZER, CAPITAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 24 (1994). 
 60. See Kenneth J. Martin & John J. McConnell, Corporate Performance, Corporate 
Takeovers, and Management Turnover, 46 J. FIN. 671 (1991). 
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failure to maximize value and the bidder’s desire to create value by 
correcting the suboptimal conduct.61
This theory of mergers offers two descriptions of conditions that make 
a firm a candidate for a disciplinary merger, one open-ended and the other 
more particular. In the general description, incumbent management is either 
incapable of running the firm efficiently or firm governance has otherwise 
broken down.
 
62 A target might be hobbled by excessive perquisite 
consumption, excessive compensation, overpayment for supplies, labor, or 
raw materials, or self enriching or self-aggrandizing projects, or a 
combination of the foregoing.63 The disciplinary acquirer creates value by 
cleaning house and replacing management.64 The more specific description 
sets out three diagnoses of management failure along with three 
accompanying cures. Under the first, target management makes ill-advised 
diversifying acquisitions, so that the successful acquirer divests the 
unrelated lines of business.65 Under the second, the target invests in excess 
productive capacity so the acquirer downsizes or otherwise constrains 
investment policy.66 Under the third, the target’s capital structure is 
underleveraged so the acquirer steps up borrowing.67 Note that while all 
three acquirer correctives impose “discipline,” broadly conceived, all three 
also implicate differences of opinion respecting the target firm’s business 
plan rather than a diagnosis of poor governance practice, narrowly 
conceived.68 Significantly, the agency story that accompanied the 1980s’ 
boom posed the buyout as the cure to all three ailments.69
Agency theory underscores and elaborates on this theory of mergers 
when it posits that agents tend to slack off and behave opportunistically.
 
70 If 
a firm’s internal governance mechanisms fail to check such a tendency, the 
firm’s stock price will decline, attracting a hostile bid.71 The hostile bidder 
thus performs a backstop governance role.72
                                                                                                                 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 823 
(5th ed. 1996). 
 64. See generally DIMSDALE & PREVEZER, supra note 59, at 25. 
 65. See Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 28, at 122. 
 66. Id. at 127–129. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Hostile Takeovers and the Correction of Managerial 
Failure, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 163, 166 (1996). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 3, at 233–236. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See R. Sinha, The Role of Hostile Takeovers in Corporate Governance, 14 APPLIED FIN. 
ECON. 1291 (2004). 
 Expanding this theory, we can 
posit an ideal world in which all management groups are subject to hostile 
offers all the time by other managers who value the corporate assets more 
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highly.73 In the ideal world, assets constantly move to the highest valuing 
user, maximizing shareholder value and economic welfare.74
The agency account goes on to link mergers’ transactional postures to 
their economic motivations. Synergistic mergers are deemed likely to be 
friendly, negotiated transactions, while disciplinary mergers are likely to 
follow from hostile tender offers.
 
75 Because friendly mergers presuppose 
the agreement and participation of incumbent management, they do not 
necessarily implicate disciplinary motives or effects.76 Indeed, pursuit of 
synergies from asset combinations sometimes improves the lot of all of the 
firm’s stakeholders.77 Hostiles, in contrast, are thought more single-
mindedly to serve the target shareholder interests and to threaten target 
stakeholder interests.78
Thus does the hostile takeover emerge, playing a central role in the 
agency account. The record of incidence, however, triggers a question about 
the account’s accuracy. Hostile takeovers have represented only a small 
portion of acquisitions, and their incidence has diminished over time.
 
79 
Figure II80
                                                                                                                 
 73. See Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 21 
(1988). 
 74. See G. William Schwert, Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?, 55 J. FIN. 
2599 (2000). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See infra Figure II. 
 80. See MERGERSTAT REVIEW (2007), available at https://www.mergerstat.com/ 
bookstore/samp_mr.pdf. 
 draws on the Mergerstat database to compare the total number of 
public company acquisitions completed during the period of 1974–2007 to 
numbers of formally registered tender offers and of registered tender offers 
formally opposed by target management. The merger waves of the 1980s 
and 1990s show up clearly, punctuated by a fall off in overall activity 
between 1989 and 1994. For present purposes, the most significant 
difference lies in the waning of hostility. Although absolute numbers of 
tender offers recovered in the mid-1990s, they did so as a much diminished 
proportion of overall merger activity. Moreover, the hostile tender offer did 
not reappear on a proportionate basis within the tender offer subset. 
Although it still exists, it has almost disappeared, relatively speaking. 
Meanwhile, as Figure I shows, buyouts returned. 
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Figure II: Total Number of Hostile Takeovers Relative to 
Total Public Company Acquisitions, 2004-200781 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Today, the private equity buyout stands as the sector of the mergers and 
acquisitions market most likely to present post closing incidences of 
governance discipline sought by agency theory. The buyout firm acts as an 
aggressive blockholder, closely monitoring performance and imposing 
performance targets.82 Even as the private equity business model includes 
and depends on the participation of management incumbents and 
incentivizes them with a share of the equity, it also includes and depends on 
an active removal threat.83 Leverage enhances the threat by interpolating the 
possibility of downside disaster, and magnifying the financial payoff for 
success.84 Accordingly, discipline is built into the governance structure 
even as pre-closing hostility is avoided.85
The comparison has important implications for the theory of the 
disciplinary merger. The surge and sudden decline of hostile takeovers 
presents a causation question. Most ascribe the change to antitakeover 
regulation.
 
86 If they are right, there still arises an inference of a disciplinary 
deficit and concomitant opportunity cost. Others, however, ascribe the 
eclipse to a range of factors. In one such view, hostility is a negotiating 
position holding out high costs quite apart from antitakeover barriers.87
                                                                                                                 
 81. Id. 
 82. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 56, at 9. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. These are friendly combinations. 
 86. See, e.g., Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the 
Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 5 (1995). 
 87. See Schwert, supra note 74, at 2599. 
  If 
that is the case, then the disappearance of hostility does not imply 
significant opportunity costs. This account dovetails with both views. Even 
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if regulation, rather than value fundamentals, choked off the hostile tender 
offer, buyouts have picked up much of the slack.88 While hostility has 
largely disappeared from the control market, discipline has not.89 And, 
because discipline holds out value, it can be interpolated on a friendly 
basis.90
The recent emergence of activist hedge funds underscores such a need. 
In this still small sector, the sleeping institutional shareholder giant rises 
from its bed.
 Accordingly, agency theory and the related ideology of corporate 
legal theory need updating. 
91 Here a new class of corporate raiders mounts hostile 
challenges to managers and business plans at publicly traded firms 
worldwide.92 These are impatient shareholders, who look for value and 
want it realized in the near or intermediate term.93 Their strategy is to tell 
managers how to realize that value and to challenge publicly those who 
resist their advice, using the proxy contest as a threat.94 The strategy has 
proved successful.95 Significantly, the strategy, while hostile, does not 
primarily aim for transfers of control.96 Instead, the players act out a game 
of threat and resistance in which victory lies in either the insurgent’s entry 
to the boardroom on a minority basis or the target’s diffusion of the threat 
with a governance concession. The game leads to cooperative outcomes in a 
significant number of cases.97
II. DISCIPLINE, LEVERAGE, AND VALUE 
 One once again notes the hostile tender 
offer’s absence and apparent evolutionary adaptation by the capital markets. 
Summing up, activist hedge fund interventions show that hostility 
survives with a disciplinary governance impact, but does so without a tie to 
control transfers. Disciplinary control transfers also survive, but only based 
on cooperative negotiations. Meanwhile, the market-driven control transfers 
on which agency theory has hung its hat for three decades are disappearing. 
It is time for a ground up reassessment of the theory’s operative 
assumptions. 
Part I took a look at buyout volume, noted the transactions’ disciplinary 
aspect, and then associated discipline with transactional friendliness, 
casting doubt on agency theory’s association between hostile initiation and 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 
63 J. FIN. 1729, 1732 (2008). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See generally id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Brav et al., supra note 88, at 1745. 
 95. See, e.g., id. at 1739–45. 
 96. William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1422–27 
(2007). 
 97. Id. at 1405–09. 
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post-closing discipline. This Part turns to agency theory’s account of buyout 
motivations. Agency theory ascribes discipline, agency cost reduction and 
productivity improvement joint and primary roles as transactional 
motivators and depicts the buyout firm in a unique role as a value creator.98
As discussed earlier, the conventional wisdom of the 1980s was that 
buyouts prevent managers from reinvesting free cash flows.
 
This Part asks how well buyout transactions sustain these theoretical 
aspirations, comparing governance improvement and leveraged gain as 
transactional motivations. It shows they both play a role in buyouts, but 
suggests leverage is better accorded the primary role in accounting for the 
recent boom. 
99 One hears 
this free cash flow story less and less as time passes. Today, some doubt 
that the free cash flow account accurately described the profiles of 1980s 
buyout targets. If the story was true, the takeovers and buyouts of the era 
would have concentrated on firms that were overinvested relative to other 
firms in their industries. At least one study by Henri Servaes, has found no 
evidence of overinvestment compared with industry benchmarks, no 
relation between abnormal returns of the target firms and measures of 
overinvestment or industry investment, and no evidence of overinvestment 
in respect of a subclass of hostile targets.100 There were two exceptions: 
larger firms and firms in the oil and gas industry.101 When considering the 
core productivity claim made for 1980s buyouts, this is a devastating result. 
Subsequent studies provide confirmation, showing that expected reductions 
of free cash flows do not primarily motivate these deals.102
Cost cutting and situation-specific management improvement are the 
remaining possible disciplinary motivators for today’s transactions. Such 
 
                                                                                                                 
 98. See generally Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 
9 YALE J. REG. 119 (1992). 
 99. Jensen supra note 36, at 323. 
 100. Servaes’s study looks for overinvestment in a class of 700 takeover and buyout targets 
during the period of 1972–87. See Henri Servaes, Do Takeover Targets Overinvest?, 7 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 253, 254 (1994). 
 101. Id. at 254. See also Boysn Jovanovic & Peter L. Rousseau, The Q-Theory of Mergers 1 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8740, Jan. 2002) (finding that the free cash 
flow account explains only a small number of mergers and asserting that a typical firm may waste 
cash on mergers but not on internal investment); Gerald T. Garvey & Gordon R. Hanka, The 
Management of Corporate Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence 520 (Jan. 13, 1997) 
(unpublished Working Paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501) (studying the effect of 
antitakeover provisions and finding that protection does not impact firm size or profitability). 
 102. See Douglas Cumming et al., Private Equity, Leveraged Buyouts and Governance, 13 J. 
CORP. FIN. 439, 441–42 (2007) (showing that targets are selected based on stock market valuation, 
undervalued companies being preferred, and the projected tax  savings stemming from leveraged 
capital structure). 
  This does not go to say that today’s managers always return free cash flow to their 
shareholders. They often horde cash, but they put it into short term liquid investments rather than 
safe businesses. See Bratton, supra note 96, at 1415–18. Such a cash account could indeed 
motivate a buyout offer, but as source of an immediate post-closing dividend rather than as a 
source of a disciplinary improvement. 
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factors are intuitively attractive, and there is empirical support for the 
proposition that buyouts involve both.103 Even so, their explanatory traction 
has limits. For example, assume that Buyout Firm X is looking at two firms, 
A and B, as potential buyout candidates. Firm A has an excellent 
management team and low leverage, but is a value stock—its steady but 
dowdy industry does not enjoy investor favor. Firm B, also with low 
leverage, is an underperformer in a more glamorous industry due to a 
substandard management team and business plan. As between the two, 
which is the better buyout candidate? Agency theory, read together with the 
EMH, signals Firm B over Firm A. If the managers are good and the stock 
price is right, Firm A holds out no value. Meanwhile, Firm B holds out a 
disciplinary arbitrage profit. In the buyout world, in contrast, Firm A is the 
quintessential target. Private equity firms look for value, which exists in 
cases of pronounced inequality between market capitalization and 
fundamental value.104
To see the importance of leverage, assume a buyout target with $1 
billion enterprise value and $700 million of debt in its post-buyout capital 
structure. If the company is sold in five years in a $1.3 billion public 
offering, the annual growth of the value of the firm is 6 percent over the 
initial $1 billion. Any number of factors can contribute to that 6 percent 
value enhancement. Certainly, firm-specific management improvements 
will help. Even so, a $1.3 billion IPO yield could be due entirely to growth 
in the economy, a stock market more inclined to favor the firm’s industry, 
or the tax advantages attending the buyout debt. Whatever the source of the 
gain, the value of the equity investment will have doubled—as a result of 
the leverage, it will show a 15 percent annual rate of return rather than a 6 
percent return. Such high returns imply high risks.
 At the same time, because the control transfer comes 
on friendly terms and the managers take equity stakes, manifest problems 
with the top team make for value-reducing frictions. Finally, value 
enhancement does not necessarily imply basic changes in the business plan. 
The leverage can do the heavy lifting in generating positive returns. 
105 If the company gets 
into difficulty and has an enterprise value of $850 million at the end of the 
five year period and has not paid down any debt, that 15 percent decline 
implies a 50 percent loss on the private equity investment.106
Either way, the buyout firm has a high powered incentive to extract 
performance improvements during the five year period. For example, on the 
upside scenario, if the target manages to cut costs sufficiently to release 
 
                                                                                                                 
 103. See Cumming et al., supra note 102, at 444–50 (summarizing the literature and discussing 
the empirical difficulties); Bruton et al., supra note 21, at 716–19 (showing performance 
improvements during the buyout period in a sample of buyout firms that later conducted reverse 
LBOs). 
 104. See Cumming et al., supra note 102, at 441 (confirming that buyout firms look for 
undervalued targets). 
 105. See Blackstone Group L.P., supra note 33, at 115. 
 106. See id. 
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enough operating cash flow to pay down $300 million of borrowing, the 
equity investment triples and the annual internal rate of return is 25 percent. 
The same performance improvement also reverses the downside result from 
a loss to a modest gain. 
The question of whether the recent buyout surge was agency-driven or 
financially-driven remains. The answer is that, while both elements 
contributed, few observers would put primary weight on the agency side.107 
Readily available credit at low interest rates fills the bill better. In mid-
2007, risk premium of junk bonds over U.S. Treasuries reached a historic 
low of 2.63 percent, compared to a 20-year average of 5.42 percent.108  It is 
true that buyouts returned from their 1990s trough with less leverage in 
their capital structures than previously, but leverage remained salient. 
Assuming a target with an enterprise value of $1 billion, a typical 
transaction in the recent wave would entail an equity investment of $300 
million and $700 million of debt.109 This debt-to-equity goal of 30–70 is 
still much more conservative than the 1980s’ rule of thumb of 20–80 or 10–
90.110 On the other hand, capital structures of restructured companies 
became riskier during the boom’s late phase.111
At the same time, lenders eased the terms of the debt, with some deals 
having terms resembling the deal terms of late 1980s. “Pay in kind toggle” 
bonds became common, giving the borrower an option to defer paying 
interest until maturity, with the deferred sums paying a higher rate. Such 
“PIK” terms were emblematic of the late 1980s leveraged capital structures 
that got into trouble after the economy faltered in 1989.
 The average ratio of cash 
flow to interest cost was 3.4 in deals closing in 2004, 2.4 in 2006 deals and 
1.7 in 2007 deals. 
112
                                                                                                                 
 107. For an empirical study of buyouts conducted in the 1990s that confirms the salience of 
financial and tax over performance motivations, see Shourun Guo, et al., Do Buyouts (Still) 
Create Value?  2–4 (June 3, 2008) (unpublished Working Paper, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1108808). 
 108. For empirical confirmation of this point, see Ulf Axelson, et al., Leverage and Pricing in 
Buyouts: An Empirical Analysis 4–5 (Aug. 2007) (unpublished Working Paper, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027127) (showing that levels of debt in LBOs are unrelated to firm 
characteristics but highly sensitive to prevailing interest rates in the leveraged loan market). 
  At the same time, merger premiums in recent years generally have been lower than in the 
1980s. Where the earlier rule of thumb was 30 to 50 percent premium, in recent years 20 percent 
deals have been common. 
 109. Blackstone Group L.P., supra note 33, at 115. 
 110. See Guo, supra note 107, at 6 (showing that 1990s buyouts entailed lower leverage and 
lower up front premiums). 
 111. See id. at 4–6. 
 112. Helen Power, Credit crisis one year on: Risky debt notes could be a losing game, THE 
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 22, 2008, at 5, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/ 
newsbysector/banksandfinance/2794340/Credit-crisis-one-year-on-Risky-debt-notes-could-be-a-
losing-game.html. 
 In addition, 
beginning in 2005, more and more private equity loans were “covenant 
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lite,” omitting debt covenants and ratio tests.113 In 2007, “covenant lite” 
loan volume reached $96.6 billion, compared with $23.6 billion recorded 
for the whole of 2006.114
The case for leverage as deal motivator also can be made negatively. As 
already noted, the buyout boom peaked in mid-2007, with activity falling 
precipitously thereafter.
 The current credit crisis has halted such extremely 
risky behavior. 
115 After mid-2007, $144 billion of pending buyouts 
were abandoned or delayed.116 Credit contraction is the reason for such a 
drop.117 The easy credit that fueled the boom depended on exit by 
securitization as well as low rates. Buyout lenders sold their loans into 
securitized packages, with the repaid principal available to fund more and 
bigger buyouts. The credit crunch has choked off the securitization pipeline, 
leaving the investment banks holding an unexpected $200 billion of buyout 
paper and looking for someone to buy it.118 Meanwhile, the value of buyout 
debt in circulation has dropped, precipitously in some cases, making sale of 
the paper in the pipeline more difficult still.119 The “covenant lite” posture 
of recent deals has aggravated the price declines.120  The banks have taken 
write-downs.121 Market participants are already drawing parallels to the 
junk bond market collapse that began in 1989.122
To the extent the parallels to the 1989 collapse hold, a challenge will be 
posed for agency theory. Back then, agency theorists blamed the credit 
collapse on new regulation.
 
123 Today they have no such excuse124
                                                                                                                 
 113. See W.Y. CAMPBELL & CO., SECOND QUARTER 2007 MIDDLE-MARKET TRANSACTION 
UPDATE 3–4 available at www.wycampbell.com/media/marketupdates/q2-07wycmarket 
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 114. See INVESCO, MARKET COMMENTATOR: LEVERAGED LOAN MARKET REVIEW 4 (2007), 
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 115. See Bloomberg News, Borrowing Costs Slowing Buyouts, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 27, 2007, at 2. 
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 117. See Thornton, supra note 116, at 30; see also Davidoff, supra note 116, at 178. 
 118. Thornton, supra note 116, at 31. 
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Leveraged Loans that Financed Buyouts are Causing Bottleneck, WALL. ST. J. Feb. 6, 2008, at 
C1. 
 120. Thornton, supra note 116, at 30–31. 
 121. Carrick Mollenkamp, et al., Leveraged Loans Inflict More Pain on Banks Globally, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 19, 2008, at C2. 
 122. Thornton, supra note 116, at 30. 
 123. See supra text accompanying notes 47–8. 
 124. It is, however, noted that Michael Jensen warns of unspecified new regulation in a posted 
PowerPoint slideshow. See Michael C. Jensen, The Economic Case for Private Equity (and Some 
Concerns) – PDF of Key Note Slides (Harvard NOM, Research Paper No. 07-02, 2007), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=963530. 
 and will 
have to account for the boom-bust cycle. Their theory ill-equips them to do 
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so. Agency theorists, very much in the Modigliani-Miller tradition, tend to 
assume that finance is irrelevant and look only to a firm’s assets for 
valuation purposes.125 Absent a specific tie between a particular capital 
structure and the incentives of the asset manager,126 agency tends to assume 
that the mode of finance is irrelevant. Leverage figures into the agency 
buyout story only as a motivator in the context of the post-closing 
relationship between target managers and their buyout firm overseers;127
III. INVESTMENT RETURNS 
 it 
is not held to motivate deals independently. 
But the real world is more complicated. Conditions conducive to 
buyouts coalesce only when targets can be outfitted with highly levered 
capital structures. Accordingly, buyouts thrive only when markets hold out 
ready credit on attractive terms. Because the credit markets only do this 
intermittently, the sector has cyclical character. And, even as the buyout 
firm has high-powered incentives to improve the target firm’s performance, 
it is not clear that performance improvement by itself motivates buyouts. 
Leveraged gain motivates independently. 
Leverage, then, is the buyout’s sine qua non. Even so, a completed 
buyout creates a high powered incentive for performance improvement and 
agency cost reduction. An empirical question arises respecting the quantum 
of improvement seen in practice. This Part takes up the question, turning 
from ex ante incentives to value generated ex post. We will see that value is 
indeed generated, but that all of it is allocated to the buyout firm. As a 
result, questions are raised for buyout structures and their incentive 
alignments. 
A. BUYOUT RETURNS 
Buyout data is hard to obtain. Once the target is taken private, its results 
disappear from the radar screen of public trading, the usual source of data 
for financial analysis. During a buyout fund’s ten-year life, one must rely 
on the sponsor’s self-serving reports. The most reliable data is generated at 
the end of the line when the buyout fund is terminated and its participants 
get their final distributions. Only then are there time-sensitive figures on 
amounts invested and returns thereon. Therefore, analyses of buyout returns 
appear on a time lag—recent studies cover buyout funds raised during the 
mid-1990s and earlier. It will be some time before there are reports on funds 
raised during the recent boom. 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Franco Modigliani & Merton Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the 
Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958). 
 126. The suboptimal reinvestment of free cash flow story told in the 1980s affected such a tie. 
See Jensen, supra note 36, at 323. 
 127. Eclipse of the Public Corporation, supra note 20, at 11–13. 
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Meanwhile, analyses of past fund returns suggest that future returns 
may be low. Financial economists have been working from a database 
collected from voluntary reports by private equity firms and private equity 
investors. Sample bias is admitted, but if it is safe to assume that the worst 
performers are less likely to report voluntarily, any skew in the data lies on 
the side of over-reporting good results.128
The leading published study from the database comes from Kaplan and 
Schoar, who analyze the returns of 169 buyout funds that were close to 
fully liquidated during the period 1980 to 2001.
 
129 Their central analytical 
tool is the “public market equivalent” (PME). This is a ratio of the present 
value of all cash distributions by the fund (including undistributed assets 
taken at book value) over the present values of all of the fund’s drawdowns 
using the year by year realized return of the S&P 500 as the discount rate.130 
A PME less than one means that the fund investor would have been better 
off putting the capital in a market index. The figures below are net fees 
retained by the fund.131
PME, 1980–2001 
 
 
Equal weighted Size weighted 
Median  0.80  0.83 
Average  0.97  0.93 
 
Internal rates of return (IRR) were as follows:132
IRR, 1980–2001 
 
 
Equal weighted Size weighted 
Median 0.13 0.15 
Average 0.19 0.19 
 
The picture is disappointing. The IRRs approximate those of the 
market. As for the PMEs, neither the equal-weighted nor size-weighted 
results beat the market. Kaplan and Schoar break the results into time 
periods to show that both PMEs and IRRs were better for funds raised in 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Steven N. Kaplan & Annette Schoar, Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, 
and Capital Flows, J. FIN. 1791, 1794 (2005). 
 129. To be included in the sample, the fund must have distributed no returns for at least six 
quarters. Kaplan and Schoar assume that any undistributed residuals values on a fund’s books are 
worth their book amount. Id. at 1794–98. It is noted that this assumption favors the funds. 
 130. Id. at 1797. 
 131. Id. at 1798. 
 132. Id. 
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the early 1980s and poorer for funds raised in the early 1990s.133 More 
particularly, out of the funds raised between 1987 and 1994, the PME 
exceeds one for only those raised in 1990.134  Because buyout funds are 
under-diversified and illiquid,135
Phalippou and Gottschalg update and extend these results, covering 
funds liquidated through 2003 and adding a sample comprised of additional 
liquidated funds.
 they would need to return PMEs somewhat 
greater than one to be investments with returns more attractive than those of 
the market. 
136 They claim to cover 57 percent of the private equity 
universe in terms of size.137 Grouping venture capital funds with buyout 
funds, they obtain an average PME of 1.01,138 which compares with Kaplan 
and Schoar’s combined aggregate PME of 1.05 for venture capital and 
buyout funds.139 This poor result is magnified when Phalippou and 
Gottschalg adjust Kaplan and Schoar’s assumptions so as to write down any 
unliquidated assets to zero.140 This causes the aggregate venture and buyout 
PME to decline to 0.88. Finally, Phalippou and Gottschalg extend their 
analysis, separate the buyout funds from the venture funds, and substitute 
for the S&P 500 a discount rate derived from a risk adjusted cost of capital 
for industry comparables.141 This reduces the buyout PME to 0.75.142
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 134. Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 128, at 1801–02. 
 135. See Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Funds 7 (Sept. 8, 
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 136. Ludovic Phalippou & Oliver Gottschalg, The Performance of Private Equity Funds 7 (EFA 
Moscow Meetings, 2005) (unpublished Working Paper, available at 
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None of this falsifies the general point that buyouts mean monitoring, 
and monitoring means productivity gains. Significantly, the PME results 
discussed above are net of the buyout firm’s fees.143 From an efficiency 
point of view, the net does not matter because it follows from an internal 
distributional agreement. What matters is the gross—the total return to the 
fund and its outside investors. The database, which depends on reporting by 
investment institutions with limited partnership stakes in the buyout funds, 
does not directly yield a gross. But Phalippou and Gottschalg, making some 
assumptions based on buyout fund fee practices, have extrapolated a gross 
PME of 1.12 for the aggregated venture capital and buyout funds.144
The question remains as to how impressive a PME of 1.12 is. The 
figure aggregates results from the database’s venture capital and buyout 
funds. As venture returns tend to be higher, the gross PME for buyout funds 
is presumably somewhat lower than 1.12. Moreover, even on a gross basis, 
some of the return over market compensates for illiquidity. Even more 
importantly, some of the return also compensates for the risk attached to the 
target firms’ levered capital structures. Note also that the 1.12 figure covers 
twenty-three years of fund liquidations stretching back to 1980. It thus 
incorporates the first boom and the period’s levels of debt in the 85 to 90 
percent range. Given these extreme capital structures, even a modest 
increase in the value of the firm meant a substantial gain for the equity held 
by the buyout fund.
 From 
an efficiency point of view, the most relevant figure is 0.11, the 
distributional portion of that 1.12 that goes to the buyout funds. 
145
B. MODES OF EXIT 
  Unfortunately, the data does not tell us just how 
much of the positive PME stems from productivity gains. Nevertheless, the 
inference still arises that it is not much. 
These overall buyout returns may seem surprising in relation to studies 
of reverse LBOs. In the standard depiction of a buyout, the transaction goes 
forward with a view to a subsequent public offering, termed a reverse LBO 
(RLBO). The RLBO returns the target equity to liquidity and enables the 
buyout fund to make cash distributions to its limited partners.146
                                                                                                                 
 143. Phalippou & Gottschalg, supra note 136, at 14–17; see also Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 
128, at 1799. 
 144. Phalippou & Gottschalg, supra note 136, at 4. 
 145. Jerry X. Cao & Josh Lerner, The Performance of Reverse Leveraged Buyouts 4 (Oct. 15, 
2006) (unpublished Working Paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=937801). 
 146. See Bruton et al., supra note 21, at 711. 
 The buyout 
fund accordingly has every incentive to engage an RLBO as soon as 
possible—one study finds that the median time in which a target stays 
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private is only three years.147 RLBO firms have been analyzed extensively 
and have good track records.148
The wider implication is that public trading market opportunities 
motivate buyouts, with a big payoff occurring as a result of the public to 
private to public round trip. And such is the case, but with a catch: the big 
payoff round trip occurs only in a minority of cases. Kaplan, working with a 
sample of 183 large buyouts completed between 1979 and 1986, found that 
by August 1990, 62 percent of the targets remained privately owned, 24 
percent were owned by other public companies, and only 14 percent were 
independent public companies.
 
149 Cao and Lerner, with a sample of RLBOs 
from 1981 to 2003, have shown that the average annual percentage of new 
LBOs to RLBOs is only 13 percent.150 The going private movement thus 
nets out on the private side over time, with round trips being the exception.  
Phalippou and Gottschalg report a similar figure respecting mode of exit in 
their sample: only 11 percent of the targets in the liquidated funds were the 
subject of an RLBO.151
Negotiated sales to publicly traded companies provide a second exit 
route, accounting for 24 percent of the targets in Kaplan’s sample.
 How then do the buyout firms liquidate their 
investments? 
152 If we 
now add the RLBOs in Kaplan’s sample to the negotiated sales, we will 
have accounted for only 38 percent of the targets. Similarly, Phalippou and 
Gottschalg, with their bigger database covering a longer period, add (1) 
asset and stock sales to publicly traded companies to (2) RLBO exits to 
account for 31 percent of the targets.153
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 It again follows that going private 
means staying private in the majority of cases. 
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It is difficult to determine what happens to these still-private targets in 
light of the fact that each fund is liquidated after ten years.154 The study 
results are thin, and the resulting picture murky. A sample of 321 exits in 
the United Kingdom between 1995 and 2004 yields the following: on the 
public side, 16 percent exited through RLBO and 29 percent exited through 
trade sale (for a total of 45 percent); and on the private side, 38 percent 
exited through receivership and 17 percent exited through secondary buyout 
(for a total of 55 percent).155 In other words, roughly two-thirds of the still-
private targets ended up in financial distress, with the rest going out as 
“secondary buyouts”: refinancings in which a second buyout firm takes out 
the original buyout firm.156 Buyout firms, then, pass off their junk targets to 
one another. Third and even fourth time transfers have occurred in the 
UK.157 There are also partial liquidations, in which pieces of targets are 
sold, often to another buyout fund.158 Alternatively, the target increases its 
borrowing or does a sale and leaseback of an asset and then makes a 
dividend of the proceeds.159
C. MONEY CHASING DEALS 
 The less hospitable the IPO market, the more 
likely the resort to these expedients. 
Buyout exit, then, is a tricky, sticky business. Big payoffs come from 
RLBOs and negotiated sales to operating companies, even as most targets 
are disposed of in the low-return back room. As such, the sector’s 
disappointing aggregate returns become less surprising. 
Studies of buyout returns that fully cover the sector’s first boom and 
bust teach us some structural points about buyout cycles. Funds floated 
early in the cycle do well.160 As good results come in and the cycle moves 
up the curve, the established players float new funds.161 Successful buyout 
firms add a new fund every three to five years.162 Since the fee structures of 
buyout funds remain relatively stable over time, a buyout firm that wishes 
to maximize returns on its invested human and reputational capital will seek 
to float a bigger fund.163
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But these late entrants are less likely to form follow-up funds, implying 
lower levels of success.164
The cyclical flow of cash into the sector correlates positively with target 
valuations—as more money comes in, buyout funds pay more to acquire 
targets.
 
165 Therefore, two inferences can be drawn. First, increases in target 
values could be attracting the inflows into buyout funds, with money 
following opportunity. Second, assuming a limited number of good targets, 
increased inflows have the demand side effect of increasing the bids, with 
the added money chasing deals. Studies support the latter inference, 
showing that fund returns are negatively correlated with capital inflows.166
If buyout returns to outside investors do not beat the market, on 
average, and buyout cycles have perverse effects on valuations as they 
approach their peaks, why do investment institutions clamor to participate 
in new buyout funds as the cycle rises? Some argue that participation in the 
sector has a portfolio effect and thus makes sense for well-diversified 
institutions.
 
167 There also is at least one value-based explanation: buyout 
returns tend to persist. A buyout firm that does well with a given fund in a 
given industry is likely to repeat the result with its next fund.168 This 
distinguishes the sector from mutual funds, where success (famously) does 
not tend to be replicated over time.169
Therefore, a minority of institutional investors likely do well with 
buyouts, given the aggregate results.
 The persistence phenomenon implies 
that some buyout firms are better than others, both in selecting and in 
monitoring their targets. The sector has winners, and an institution invested 
in a winner will benefit from above market returns. 
170 Overconfidence is a standard 
behavioral explanation for this sort of investment pattern—although only 
one-quarter of investors will make abnormally positive returns, the capital 
still pours in because 100 percent of investors believe themselves able to 
pick the winners.171
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 Business practices in the sector encourage such 
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delusions. Buyout firms and their industry associations issue selective and 
skewed reports of historical results.172 At the same time, it appears that 
institutional investors bring to bear unsophisticated analytical yardsticks. 
They use a payback model, looking to double their money across the ten-
year buyout fund term.173 In so doing, they ignore the cautionary advice of 
elementary finance textbooks. Finally, selective incentives could be 
motivating some of these institutions—maybe they seek service 
relationships with the buyout firm and maybe their salary structures reward 
their managers for the buyout fund’s interim results.174
Fundraising by buyout firms was 37 times greater in 1998 than it was in 
1985, and by 2006 was more than 100 times greater than in 1985, 
suggesting the end may be near.
 
175
D. FEES 
 If money chases deals into this sector 
and returns from funds raised near a cyclical peak tend to come in on the 
low end of the scale, the future could be bleak. 
If we accept Kaplan and Schoar’s buyout PME of 0.93 and concede that 
the implicit result, gross of fees, is greater than one, the implication is that 
the buyout firm takes all the gain it creates. Financial economists do not 
find this result surprising, having already concluded as a theoretical 
proposition that, in equilibrium, fund managers take all the rents.176
Private equity firms take fees on a number of bases. Most of their yield 
is asset (rather than profit) based.
 Still, 
further inquiry into the private equity fee structure is warranted. If, as 
agency theory suggests, buyout governance structures approach the ideal in 
part because an arm’s length contract distributes the rents, the distributional 
particulars hold out extraordinary interest. Here at last we see capitalism 
allocate risk and return in respect of large operating companies in a high-
incentive context free of regulatory distortions. 
177 Historically, buyout firms took asset 
fees of two percent of the capital committed to the buyout funds per fund 
year.178 Assuming a ten-year duration and actual investment of all capital 
committed by the funds' institutional limited partners, an archetypical 
buyout firm took twenty cents on the dollar off the top, actually investing 
only eighty cents on the dollar.179
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 But the practice has evolved so as to scale 
back the two percent asset fee. Some funds reduce the annual two percent 
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by 25 basis points per year starting in the sixth year; other funds leave the 
two percent in place but shift to invested (as opposed to committed) capital 
beginning in the sixth year; and other funds combine both reductions, 
shifting to invested capital on a declining percentage basis in the sixth 
year.180 As a result of all this, the buyout firm’s current median off-the-top 
draw of committed capital decreases to 12 percent.181
Private equity firms also charge carried interest.
 
182 This is 20 percent of 
profits, with 83 percent of the funds measuring profits against committed 
(as opposed to invested) capital.183 In addition, in 93 percent of the funds, 
the buyout firm must surmount a hurdle before drawing down the carry.184 
For example, the investors must have received 8 percent on their committed 
capital before the buyout firm may draw down, with the buyout firm taking 
all of the next profit tranche until the carry is fully paid. There also are claw 
backs for cases where later distributions prove insufficient to support the 
full carry basis.185 Metrick and Yasuda usefully describe this compensation 
device as a fractional (20 percent) call option on the proceeds of 
investment, with the strike price equal to the carry basis.186
Finally, the buyout fund imposes charges on the target company.
 
187 A 
transaction fee is charged upon both the sale and purchase of a target.188 In 
between, the target pays an annual monitoring fee based on its EBITDA.189 
The range in practice is one to five percent with smaller targets paying the 
higher rate.190 Both of these fee streams are shared between the buyout 
firms and the outside investors.191
The yield to a buyout firm on a given target will vary depending on the 
particular contract terms. Metrick and Yasuda construct a simulation that 
yields the buyout firm a median of $19.36 for every $100 invested by the 
limited partners.
 
192 The breakdown is as follows—the asset fee yields 
$11.78 (61 percent), the carry yields $5.35 (28 percent) and the fixed fees 
yield $ 2.11 (11 percent).193
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 In other words, the package’s high incentive 
component accounts for only 28 percent of the buyout fund’s returns. 
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E. SUMMARY 
The lure of asset fees on committed capital assures us that buyout firms 
will remain incented to raise capital and find targets. Once they do, the 
carry will keep them incentivized to monitor their targets. Whether 
institutional investors will continue to view the sector with favor, given the 
track record of below-market returns, presents more of a question. Much 
will depend on the results of funds presently in existence. If the past is a 
guide to the future, the results will not be good. Superior performance will 
be there only for a small number of astute institutions. 
This unsatisfactory picture holds out a lesson for agency theory. Recall 
that agency theory, as it grapples to solve the problem of separated 
ownership and control in publicly-held firms, turns again and again to the 
institutional investor community to look for some way to energize it into a 
productive governance role. Here, after a look at the one sector agency 
theory praises for incentive compatibility, it becomes hard to envision what 
such a productive governance role might be. All institutions have been able 
to do in thirty years in the buyout sector is bargain for modification in the 
governing limited partnership agreements’ distributional terms.194
Other lessons for agency theory lie in the financial structure that places 
the buyout firm in the position of incentivized monitor. Recall that agency 
theory also looks at blockholding shareholders as potential active 
principals, but that the analysis runs into incentive problems.
 Although 
the terms have improved, they are still insufficient to allow the institutions 
to escape the trap of below-market results. Actors such as these do not 
come forth as plausible candidates to solve collective action problems and 
create value. 
195 So let us 
now consider the buyout as a form of blockholding. The buyout fund takes 
the blockholder position, but the motivating governance incentives do not, 
strictly speaking, lie in the fund as blockholder entity. They instead lie in 
the buyout firm acting as the general partner of the blockholding limited 
partnership. Accordingly, the equity interest can be viewed in the target 
through the buyout firm’s lens. How patient is this equity stake? The fund’s 
ten year duration gives the arrangement a patient appearance. But 
appearances can deceive. Given the bonus held out by carried interest, the 
buyout firm has every incentive to shorten the duration of the fund’s 
ownership. The fact that target firms held for the full ten years tend to be 
losers196
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 attests to this incentive’s real world effects. At the same time, the 
limited partnership arrangement does solve the blockholder incentive 
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problem. But, it does so by assuring that the party doing the actual 
monitoring (1) is not the blockholder itself, (2) is not required to make a 
significant equity capital investment ex ante,197 and (3) is compensated on 
an assured, priority basis through the combination of an asset-based charge 
to the blockholder’s outside investors and a cut of the target’s annual cash 
flow. The performance improvement incentive, in turn, is structured as an 
option, which means that the holder takes a profit share on the upside but 
suffers no loss on the downside.198
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Thus, while the buyout firm has a strong 
incentive to make improvements to the target, loss aversion does not figure 
directly into the mix. 
Now to the bottom-line question of whether this arrangement holds out 
lessons for operating companies burdened with agency costs. The analytical 
exercise of collapsing the limited partnership (and its general and limited 
partners) into the target firm to see what the unitary entity looks like helps 
provide an answer. From this point of view, the buyout firm’s participation 
resembles a majority voting preferred stock with a high fixed dividend and 
an added pro rata participation. Only an operating company desperate for 
capital would issue stock on such terms. In any event, the analogy fails on a 
key point: the buyout firm has not necessarily contributed significant capital 
and so may not risk significant capital loss. We accordingly might look for 
an analogy elsewhere, comparing the buyout firm to an outside CEO, who 
brings only reputational capital to the table. This analogy also fails on a key 
point—unlike the CEO, the buyout firm owes no duty of loyalty. In any 
event, this deal does not make business sense either. Today’s properly 
incentivized CEO is not supposed to receive a fixed salary equal to eight 
percent of the equity value of the firm. Nor would we expect a stock option 
plan to divert to the CEO twenty percent of the gain on the stock, at least on 
a rule of thumb basis. 
In the end, the buyout super monitor bears no familial relationship 
whatsoever to a long-term equityholder, block or otherwise. 
The private equity buyout overcomes the problems of separated 
ownership and control by combining a debt-heavy, risky capital structure 
with a transfer of control to a temporary super-monitor who makes no 
significant capital contribution but takes all of the monitoring gain. High 
powered incentives result. The structure appears to work within its own 
limited durational framework, subject to a question concerning the 
distribution of gain between the super-monitor and the outside equity 
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investors. At the same time, the structure does not appear to hold out an all 
purpose replacement for the still-potent combination of unlimited duration 
equity capital and market liquidity. 
